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This paper examines the mechanisms involved in the 
interpretation of utterances that are both metaphorical and 
ironical. For example, when uttering ‗He‘s a real number-
cruncher‘ about a total illiterate in maths, the speaker uses a 
metaphor with an ironic intent. I argue that in such cases both 
logically and psychologically, the metaphor is prior to irony. I 
hold that the phenomenon is then one of ironic metaphor, 
which puts a metaphorical meaning to ironic use, rather than an 
irony used metaphorically (§1). This result is then used to 
argue for the claim that in metaphor, it is metaphorical, not 
literal, meaning that determines the utterance‘s truth 
conditions. Gricean accounts, which exclude metaphorical 
meaning from truth conditional content and rely entirely on 
conversational implicature, are seen to be unsatisfactory. Five 
contextualist arguments are briefly discussed to the conclusion 
that metaphorical content is part of truth-conditional content, 
rather than implicated (§2).  
 
1. Metaphor’s Priority Over Irony  
 
1.1 When Does Metaphor Combine With Irony? 
 
Although metaphor and irony have typically been studied independently,1 very little attention 
has been paid to the constraints the two figurative meanings put on the interpretation of each another 
when they combine. The cases I am concerned with in this paper are illustrated below.  
 
(1) a. You are the cream in my coffee. (Grice 1989) 
 b. She is the Taj Mahal. (Bezuidenhout 2001) 
 c. Shamir is a towering figure. (Stern 2000) 
 d. What delicate lacework! (Stern 2000) 
 
While each of the utterances in (1) may be used metaphorically to convey, respectively, that the 
hearer is the most precious thing in the speaker‘s life, that the woman in question is very attractive, 
that Shamir is a powerful politician, and that someone‘s calligraphy is beautiful—they may also be 
used ironically without loss of these metaphorical meanings. So used, (1a) conveys that the hearer 
has fallen short of the speaker‘s affection; (1b) that the woman in question is far from being 
attractive; (1c) that Shamir is not taken seriously or respected among his peers; and (1d) that 
someone‘s handwriting is illegible. 
In these latter cases, how should we describe the utterance? Is it an ironic metaphor, or a 
metaphorical irony? This question concerns the logical order of interpretation as well as the temporal 
order in the actual psychological processing. Do we first interpret the utterance metaphorically and 
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only then determine its ironic interpretation? Or do we first determine the ironic interpretation and 
then interpret it metaphorically? Either way, is the actual order of processing merely contingent, or is 
there some logical reason why the order could not be different?  
The challenge of interpreting such cases is that of establishing the order of interpretation that 
would allow the two figures to intermingle in a way that leads to the creation of a new compound 
figure. The aim of this paper is to spell out the constraints the two figures put on the interpretation of 
each other, more precisely how they interact and adjust one to another so as to yield the intended 
compound meaning. Existing approaches to metaphor and irony focus only on their specific nature 
and their underlying mechanisms of interpretation when used in isolation. But when two figures 
combine, they illuminate further constraints such approaches must respect, as well as raising a host of 
questions that are of independent interest.  
 
1.2 Metaphor Priority Thesis 
 
Let us refer to the logical and psychological theses that in ironic metaphor, the metaphor is 
prior to the irony as the metaphor priority thesis (henceforth MPT). Whereas a psychological thesis 
pertains to claims about the psychological order in which a given interpretation might go, a logical 
thesis pertains to claims about logical constraints that impose an order on the logical structuring of 
contents, such that some contents must usually work as input for inferring further contents. In the 
case of ironic metaphors, the two theses become as follows. Logical MPT predicts that metaphorical 
content must work as input to ironical content, such that irony builds on metaphor, rendering it 
subservient to an ironic communicative goal. Psychological MPT relies on empirical evidence to the 
effect that metaphorical meaning is processed generally quicker (and is less complex) than ironical 
meaning, thus suggesting a processing order in which metaphor is prior to irony. 
Grice (1989:34) appears to advocate logical MPT, when he claims that in (1a) the hearer has 
to reach first the metaphor ‗You are my pride and joy,‘ and then calculate an ironic interpretation 
‗You are my bane,‘ on the basis of metaphor. Unfortunately, however, he does not give an argument 
for this claim. Nor does he explain how the passage from metaphorical to ironical meaning is 
negotiated. I aim to remedy this omission, as well as suggesting tentative empirical hypotheses that 
this is the psychological order in which the two figures are computed. 
As a general strategy I distinguish weak from strong versions of both logical and 
psychological MPT, depending on whether some or all cases are covered. 
 
(2) Weak MPT:  in some cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is/has to be computed first.  
Strong MPT:  in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is/has to be computed first. 
 
So we are left with four versions of MPT. The weakest is weak psychological MPT. The strongest is 
strong logical MPT. 
 
1.2.1 Psychological MPT 
 
It is often claimed that irony operates globally on propositional contents to determine new 
contents.2 But at least sometimes metaphor operates locally on expressions (before the whole 
utterance is computed).3 Since local operations work prior to global operations, this seems to support 
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 Starting with rhetoric, and then Gricean tradition, irony is widely viewed as operating on the propositional content 
of the utterance to yield a conversational implicature, typically the opposite of that content. 
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 For various arguments of locality based on the idea that metaphor is computed at word-level prior to the literal 
interpretation of the whole utterance, see Récanati (2004), Stern (2000), Carston (2002), Sperber & Wilson (2008). 




(weak) psychological MPT. In those cases in which the metaphoric interpretation is local, the irony 
comes into play only after all interpretations involving words have been calculated.  
The explanation for metaphor‘s priority seems to lie in the different mechanisms of 
interpretation that irony and metaphor require. If they were similar in nature, we would expect more 
freedom, and hence the possibility of inverting the order of interpretation. Clearly, however, 
metaphors and ironies call on different interpretive resources: hearers make use of their knowledge of 
conceptual domains to understand metaphors, whereas they employ metarepresentational abilities to 
infer speakers‘ beliefs about others‘ beliefs or the so-called ‗theory of mind‘ (ToM). Comparing the 
interpretation of metaphor and irony, Winner & Garner (1979/93:442) suggest that the relation 
between metalinguistic awareness and interpretive understanding differs in the two cases. Whereas 
with metaphor it is possible to recognize the utterance as metaphorical, although sometimes being 
unsure about the exact content of speaker‘s meaning, recognizing the utterance as being ironical 
ensures grasping the ironical content: 
 
[In metaphor] it is as if the listener said, ―I know the speaker is being metaphorical, but I do not know 
what [s]he is getting at.‖ In the case of irony, once one recognizes that the speaker is being ironic, 
there is a click of comprehension and the speaker‘s meaning is grasped. It is difficult to imagine 
thinking, ‗I know the speaker is being ironic but I just don‘t know what [s]he means.‘ Rather, one is 
more likely to think, ‗Oh, now I understand. He was being ironic!‘ 
 
Such considerations seem to block the adoption of the strong psychological MPT from the 
mere argument of the locality of metaphor, since irony might sometimes be computed locally. Irony 
may arise locally, for example, when the underlying contrast between the utterance content is what is 
expected in the circumstances is highly salient, and moreover when the target that bears the most 
ironic weight occurs at the beginning of the utterance.4 To illustrate, consider (3) said looking at and 
referring to an old woman.  
 
(3) The fountain of youth is getting her pension. 
 
Given the salient information that the woman in question, who was known as a beauty, became old 
and decrepit, we might expect an utterance of (3) to be immediately recognized as ironical, that is, 
upon processing the definite description ‗fountain of youth.‘ If irony is claimed to be computed 
locally in this sense, the question of a priority order is then difficult to adjudicate since it leaves room 
for the possibility that irony is prior to metaphor. But it is not certain that we do compute irony first, 
even though we might recognize an ironic intention locally, since the contrast upon which irony 
relies is between a purported metaphorical claim and how things really are. Thus, to understand what 
                                                                                                                                                             
The argument proposed by relevance theorists follows from a claim about the continuity from literal/loose uses to 
metaphoric and hyperbolic uses. They treat metaphor as operating in the same way as literal, loose and hyperbolic 
interpretations: a pragmatic adjustment involves accessing a relevant subset of the information (logical and 
encyclopaedic) made available by the lexical concept and using it to inferentially construct the intended (―ad hoc‖) 
concept—i.e. a concept whose extension is narrower or broader than that of the lexical concept. What makes the 
resulting interpretation intuitively literal, approximate, hyperbolical, or metaphorical, is the particular set of 
encyclopaedic assumptions actually selected in making the utterance relevant in the expected way. The concept 
conveyed by a metaphor, or hyperbole, draws on a broadening of the lexical concept (or a combination of 
broadening and narrowing), as part of the mutual adjustment mechanism between explicit content and implicatures 
(see Wilson & Carston (2007)).   
4
 A local analysis of irony would justify a semantic account of sarcasm, say, in terms of a SARC-operator at the 
logical form, whose function is to invert the truth conditional content of a word‘s literal semantic content. For a 
rejection of such an account see Camp (forth.). Gibbs (1994) provides empirical evidence to the effect that in rich 





the irony is about, hearers have to have understood that the description ‗fountain of youth‘ refers to a 
salient woman that is metaphorically described as being young, vivacious, alert, etc. Only after the 
metaphorical content is computed can it be ironically interpreted to convey that such a metaphorical 
description is ridiculous in the circumstances. This result could not be reached on an irony-first 
approach, since there is no clear ironic content derived the literal meaning, such that when 
reinterpreted metaphorically yields the intended compound meaning. So even when the irony seems 
to be locally recognised, determining the full ironical content requires having computed the 
metaphorical content. Hence, irony necessarily builds on the metaphorical content, supporting MPT. 
Of course, claims of locality or globality should be settled empirically. The psychological 
literature has focused mainly on the comparison in comprehension time between metaphor and irony 
processing and their respective literal counterparts, suggesting that metaphors are (generally) 
processed as quickly as literal counterparts,5 and ironies take (generally) longer than their literal 
counterparts.6 If we take such results at face value, this seems to supports a weak psychological MPT 
to the effect that metaphor is expected to be (generally) processed quicker than irony. 
 Very few empirical studies test the processing order in ironic metaphors, so as to establish a 
strong psychological MPT, i.e. that in all cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor is computed before 
irony. Colston & Gibbs‘ (2002) study is relevant in that in comparing metaphor/irony compounds 
(‗He‘s really sharp!‘) with simple ironies (‗He‘s really smart!‘), they found that the compounds take 
longer to process than simple ironies. They explain the increased difficulty in terms of an ambiguity 
about whether the utterance is used metaphorically, ironically, or both.7 An interesting line of inquiry 
they suggested as a way of testing the processing underlying ironic metaphors is to compare the 
number of metarepresentations involved in such cases with those involved in simple ironies.8 A first 
hypothesis they propose is that the metarepresentational inferences involved in understanding ironic 
metaphors are fewer than those involved in understanding simple ironies. This result is explained by 
metaphor‘s capacity for muting the ironical meaning, thereby enhancing metaphoric effects and 
attenuating the speaker‘s critical attitude, which is characteristic of irony.9 While I agree with their 
intuition, it remains unclear why and how the layers of metarepresentations are reduced in such 
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 Ortony et al., 1978; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Gerrig & Healey, 1983; Gibbs, 1994; Glucksberg, 2001. 
6
 Results from Giora & Fein (1999), Dews & Winner (1999); Fillik & Moxey (in press) converge on the suggestion 
that irony might take longer to process, the additional time being taken by the processing of the literal meaning 
(either before if the irony is unfamiliar, or in parallel if the irony is familiar). Different results are, however, reported 
from a direct-access view of irony suggesting that irony is processed directly in rich, supportive contexts, with no 
contextual incompatible interpretive phase (Gibbs, 1986, 1994; Katz et al. 2004). Further studies suggest that when 
echoic elements are present and explicit, this facilitates considerably the understanding of irony (Jorgensen et al., 
1984; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989; Keenan & Quigley, 1999).  
7
 Giora (2003) also found that familiar metaphors take longer to understand in ironic contexts rather than in non-
ironic ones. She (2008:155) suggests that such the increased difficulty might be due to irony‘s novelty: even though 
the metaphor used is familiar, using it ironically renders the irony unfamiliar requiring more processing effort. 
8
 Testing the difference in metaphor and irony comprehension in autistic patients, Happé (1993) found an asymmetry in 
their processing: metaphor is interpreted via 1
st
-order ToM [The speaker believes that (P)], while irony requires 2
nd
-order 
ToM {The speaker believes that [someone else believes that (P)]}. Whatever the reality about metaphor is, there is 
overwhelming evidence that for understanding irony subjects need to think about the thoughts the speaker is 
thinking of. This is vital for distinguishing irony from mistakes or deception (see Winner (1988)).  
9
 If the point the speaker of an ironic metaphor aims to achieve is primarily ironical, we may wonder why she 
bothers to use a metaphor. One explanation is that in using a metaphor (usually a positive one) with an ironic intent, 
speakers make the contrast between the positive referent and the negative situation less vivid, thereby attenuating the 
threatening attitude that ironies usually convey. The metaphor seems to ensure a buffer zone for the ironical contrast 
to be diffused, creating a space for metaphoric effects to resonate. If a sensitive hearer argues with, or questions, her 
ironic attitude, the speaker may retreat behind this buffer by claiming that she merely meant to be metaphorical. 




compounds, even if we might concede that the metarepresentation associated with metaphor is 
somewhat less strong. 
A second hypothesis following from Happé‘s findings that metaphor requires 1st-order ToM 
and irony 2nd-order ToM is to say that the processing of metaphor/irony compounds requires more 
metarepresentations as compared to simple ironies. On the assumption that metaphor does require a 
1st-order ToM, the number of metarepresentations involved in understanding ironic metaphor might 
go up to three layers, which may be represented as: {The speaker believes that [X believes that (X 
believes that ((P))]}. As with simple ironies, to understand ironic metaphors hearers have to think of 
what thoughts, other than her own, the speaker is thinking of, for example that she is echoing that 
someone else is thinking of a given state of affairs. Whereas the state of affairs to which the person 
being echoed is thinking of is presented in literal terms in simple irony, in ironic metaphor it is 
presented in metaphorical terms. Now, if Happé is right that to understand metaphors hearers have to 
think that the speaker is thinking of a state of affairs, it follows that in cases of ironic metaphor the 
metarepresentation associated with the metaphor is added to the 2nd-order metarepresentation 
deployed to understand that the speaker is putting forward someone else‘s thought/claim, which is a 
metaphorical thought/claim. This possibility easily explains that processing ironic metaphors should 
take longer than simple ironies. It is, however, empirically suspect, given that the comprehension time 
ratings for metaphor suggest that it is generally processed as easily as literal speech.  
 A third hypothesis, which I favour, is to say that understanding ironic metaphor requires the 
same amount of metarepresentational inferences as processing simple ironies. Adding a metaphor to 
a speaker‘s ironic utterance should not complicate the metarepresentations the hearer has to infer. 
The fact that the hearer has to think about the speaker‘s thoughts about another‘s thoughts to understand 
(simple) irony (thus requiring 2nd-order ToM), or about her thoughts about someone else‘s metaphorical 
thoughts to understand ironic metaphor should not increase the number of metarepresentational 
inferences. That amounts to saying that someone else‘s metaphorical thought that is echoed or pretended 
in ironic metaphors makes the same contribution as any literal thought of an actual/potential state of 
affairs, since both contribute to the utterance‘s truth-conditional content. If this hypothesis is plausible, 
it suggests that it is someone else‘s metaphorical thought that is being ironized, further suggesting 
that the metaphor is part of the metarepresentation that is needed to understand the irony. This seems 
to support strong psychological MPT. 
If metaphor/irony compounds do not involve more metarepresentations than simple ironies, 
why do they take longer to process? Colston & Gibbs (2002) suggest that the additional processing 
time is due to a combination of different processing modes which might produce an interference 
between a descriptive mode for metaphor and an interpretive mode for irony, as compared to a single 
processing mode involved in irony. This is indeed what we would predict from a relevance-theoretic 
perspective, which holds that metaphor is understood descriptively (to represent a possible/actual 
state of affairs), while irony is understood interpretively (to (meta)represent another representation—
a possible/actual utterance/thought—that it resembles in content). The prediction is that combining 
different processing modes, as is needed in ironic metaphors, increases the effort necessary to 
understand what speakers mean more than in understanding simple ironies, where only one 
processing mode is required. 
Furthermore, there is reason to believe that the two processing modes specific to metaphor 
and irony are not only different but they somehow interfere with one another. I conjecture that the 
kind of mesh underlying ironic metaphors is different from the one underlying sarcastic indirect 
requests, such as (4a), where the speaker is both making an indirect request and being sarcastic about 
it. Testing comprehension times for such sarcastic indirect requests, Gibbs (1986a) found that 
processing (4a) is faster than processing the corresponding direct request in (4b) or the literal 






(4) a.  Why don‘t you take your time to wash the dishes?  
b.  Hurry up and wash the dishes. 
c.  Please wash the dishes. 
 
Gibbs explains the easiness in grasping a sarcastic indirect request by arguing that both 
sarcasm and indirect request are indirect meanings, and therefore don‘t interfere one with another. 
That is an interesting line of thought, although it is not very obvious how it applies to cases of ironic 
metaphors, unless suggesting that one meaning is direct and the other is indirect, thus somehow 
interfering one with another. But how do we distinguish which one is direct and which is indirect? 
 I shall argue in Section 2 that it is the metaphor that might be considered as a direct meaning 
in the sense that it contributes to the utterance‘s truth-conditional content, whereas irony is held to be 
indirect in that it is merely implied. This difference, together with the assumption that metaphor is 
typically processed locally and irony is typically processed globally, seems to suggest that when 
metaphorical and ironical meanings are combined, they might interfere, thus slowing down the 
processing. Still, another possible explanation of the additional processing involved in understanding 
ironic metaphors might be related to the quality of the metaphoric interpretation. For example, in 
those cases in which the metaphoric interpretation is indeterminate and open-ended, given that the 
metaphor is computed first, the whole interpretation of the ironic metaphor is delayed and 
indeterminate because the hearer might just be uncertain about the exact metaphorical content that is 
ironically intended. 
 
1.2.2 Weak Logical MPT 
 
Whereas psychological MPT predicts, on the basis of empirical evidence, that ironic 
metaphors are, as a matter of fact, understood by first processing the metaphor and then the irony, 
logical MPT is rather concerned with establishing logical constraints that explain why the order of 
interpretation should go this way rather than another way. First, I will consider whether there any 
evidence for weak logical MPT, to the effect that in some cases of ironic metaphor, the metaphor has 
to be prior to irony. My strategy is to look at the difficulties for the reversed, irony-first, order of 
interpretation and argue from this to the conclusion that the order of interpretation must go the other 
way, that is, metaphor-first approach.  
To illustrate, consider the case in which the sentence in (1d) repeated below as (5) is used to 
convey that a doctor‘s indecipherable scrawl is illegible.  
 
(5) What delicate lacework! (Stern 2000) 
 
If irony has priority over metaphor, it seems difficult to pin down an appropriate contrary to the 
literal term,10 which when interpreted metaphorically yields the intended interpretation. At least in 
some cases, therefore, there is a conceptual difficulty underlying the irony-first approach, since there 
is no rational route to the literal term‘s opposite, without first retrieving the metaphor. As Stern 
(2000:236) observes: 
 
The element of the context that is most relevant to determine the appropriate contrary [of the literal 
term] at this first stage is information related to the feature in terms of which the expression will then 
be interpreted metaphorically at the second stage. So, to select an ironic contrary, it is necessary to 
have some knowledge already of the metaphorical interpretation of the expression. 
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 Irony has far richer meanings than the contrary of what is said by the utterance. For simplicity, I rely on this 
traditional view here. 





As Stern explains, the difficulty in finding the relevant ironic contrary independent of the 
metaphorical meaning is due to a difficulty in finding ―a literal (ironic) contrary of the original 
expression, which, under its subsequent metaphoric interpretation, will express a feature contrary to 
the feature metaphorically expressed by the original expression‖ (ibid.). Thus, the objection to irony-
first approach is that it is difficult to find the contrary of the metaphorical expression, before 
understanding that expression metaphorically. 
Building on Stern‘s objection, I argue that an irony-first approach gives the wrong 
predictions in the majority of cases. For the sake of argument, suppose that an irony-first order of 
interpretation is available for (5). This can be represented in two stages: a simple irony which can be 
represented via a negation operator as in (6a), and the resulting content is further reinterpreted by 
locally modulating the literal meaning ‗lacework‘ into a metaphorical meaning as in (6b).11 
 
(6) a.  That‘s NOT delicate lacework.  
b.  That‘s NOT beautiful/crafted handwriting. 
 
There are two problems with this explanation, however. Firstly, an irony-first order of 
interpretation misses its target in the sense that it doesn‘t apply to the intended reference, here the 
doctor‘s handwriting. Apart from yielding a banal literal truth (that the handwriting in question is not 
delicate lacework), the ironical content realized as negation is too weak. As such, it leaves open the 
computation of irrelevant contrasts (e.g. a piece of embroidery, tapestry, etc.), thus hindering the 
possibility of connecting with the intended reference. There is the danger that in a context in which it 
is highly salient that some expensive curtains have just been ripped to shreds, the utterance in (5) 
might be taken as a simple irony, the interpretation wrongly stopping at the first stage, since there is 
no need to go further reinterpreting the ironical content metaphorically.  
The second, more general, problem is a matter of scope. It rests on the two following 
assumptions. Irony operates globally taking wide-scope on the propositional contents (even in cases 
where irony might be recognised locally), so as to determine new contents (typically by reversing the 
literal content of the sentence uttered). But metaphor operates sometimes locally, that is, it takes sub-
sentential scope, by pragmatically adjusting the literal meaning of a word/expression. Since local 
operations work prior to global operations, this suggests that the scope operated by metaphor ought 
to have been effected before the irony takes scope on the whole sentence. This supports a weak 




1.2.3 Strong Logical MPT 
 
Is there any evidence for strong logical MPT, that in all cases of ironic metaphor, the 
metaphor has to be computed first? Bezuidenhout (2001) defends a strong logical MPT, arguing that 
in all cases of ironic metaphor it is impossible for irony to work as a springboard for metaphor. In 
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 Relevance-theorists advocates (Bezuidenhout 2001; Carston 2002; Wearing 2006; Récanati 2004; Sperber & 
Wilson 2008) defend a so-called direct view of metaphor on which metaphor is hold to be understood via a local 
pragmatic process of modulation or broadening the lexical meaning of the word used metaphorically. 
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 Even if we consider the possibility that irony is local (e.g. ‗delicate‘ is used ironically), it seems that the irony-first 
construal ‗That lacework is NOT delicate‘ which is then interpreted metaphorically ‗That doctor‘s handwriting is 
NOT delicate‘ does not give, however, the intended reading, i.e. that one and the same element (‗lacework‘) is 





contrast, Stern (2000) defends only a weak logical MPT, by making provision for an irony-first 
approach in cases where a highly conventional metaphor is used ironically. For example, he argues 
that in cases such (1c), repeated here as (7), uttered about a politician who is not well respected, 
either order of interpretation may do.  
 
(7) Shamir is a towering figure.  
 
Stern‘s argument for the indeterminate order of interpretation is conditioned upon the 
metaphor‘s conventionality. It is because the metaphorical meaning ‗person of significant 
importance‘ is conventionalized as one of the lexicalized meanings of ‗towering figure,‘ that is, it is 
automatically retrieved without inferring it from the literal content of the utterance, that the 
metaphorical content can be easily retrieved either before or after the irony. It can be easily 
retrievable in either position. Clearly, if it is retrieved before the irony then the situation is just like 
simple irony, since the metaphorical processing involved would be just another form of lexical 
meaning retrieval. But if it is retrieved after the irony, there is no justification for delaying a lexical 
(metaphorical) retrieval until after the ironical content is computed, say, automatically selecting 
social unimportance from the ironical content of diminutive stature.13  
Even so, Stern is right in pointing out that an irony-first approach is sometimes possible. 
When this is possible is, however, different from the motivation Stern gave us. In my view, it isn‘t 
because metaphor is conventional that irony may come first in the order of interpretation, but rather 
because irony is conventional so that its conventionalized meaning is readily accessible.  
To illustrate, consider (8) uttered by a financial reporter talking about the economic crisis, 
while pointing out that the stock market has just gone down drastically.  
 
(8) It‘s a sunny day today, isn‘t it.  
 
The reporter is both ironical and metaphorical. Given that the irony is highly entrenched, on an irony-
first approach, it is arguably computed first as referring to terrible weather as in (9a), and then 
reinterpreted metaphorically as pertaining to the economic disaster as in (9b).  
 
(9) a.  The weather is terrible today.  
b.  The economic news is bad today. 
 
This is arguably possible only in cases where the irony is conventional, and it is marked by ironic 
intonation. This suggests a weak logical MPT, to the effect that metaphor is generally logically prior to 
irony, but in a minority of cases this needn‘t be so.   
 Pace such cases, I argue that in the majority of cases a metaphor-first order of interpretation 
is the most explanatory approach. I want now to consider some implications from logical MPT, and 
suggest that the order in which metaphor and irony are interpreted brings something more beyond the 
speaker meaning qua-content drawing on the composition of metaphor and irony. A first claim is that 
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 An analogous argument comes from the ironic use of idioms. For instance, a quasi-metaphorical idiom don’t give 
up the ship used to communicate that one should persevere in the face of adversity, when it is used in the context of 
someone giving up, it functions ironically, but only if it is first understood as metaphor for perseverance. Similarly, 
the idiom burying the hatchet refers to declaring an end to hostilities, but when it is used in the context of someone 
NOT making the peace, it will function ironically. Other examples of this sort are locking the barn door after the 
cows have fled, striking gold, it’s a gold mine, etc. Thanks to Sam Glucksberg for suggesting the parallel with 
idioms and the examples. The important point with idioms used ironically is that they reveal the necessity of 
appealing to their original metaphorical meaning/image in the first place (which got conventionalised), and on which 
the ironical meaning can then be built so as to serve ironic conversational uses of the idiom. 




the correct standard interpretation of an ironic metaphor, such as (1c)—‗Shamir is a towering figure‘ 
uttered about an infatuated politician—is closer to that of the associated simple irony in (10a) than it 
is to that of the associated simple (negated) metaphor in (10b). 
 
(10)  a. Utterance   He is important 
Ironical meaning  He is not important 
  b. Utterance   He is not a towering figure 
Metaphorical meaning  He is not important 
 
Although (10a) and (10b) seem to deliver similar outputs, only the associated irony in (10a) captures 
the speaker‘s attitude of contempt towards the politician‘s inflated opinion about his important career. 
Such attitude is absent in the associated negated metaphor in (10b). It is also lacking when the 
positive metaphor is used ironically, since the ironic attitude targets the literal content pertaining to 
Shamir‘s shortness rather than to his social importance. 
That cases of ironic metaphor are closer to irony rather than to metaphor suggests a further 
claim that this result is correctly predicted by a metaphor-first approach as in (11), but is not 
correctly predicted by an irony-first approach as in (12). 
 
(11)  Metaphor-first approach 
Utterance He is a towering figure 
Metaphor: He is important 
Irony:  He is not important 
 
(12)  Irony-first approach 
Utterance He is a towering figure 
Irony:  He is not a towering figure (He is short/diminutive) 
Metaphor: He is not important 
 
Although the two approaches seem to deliver the same content as output, I suggest that there is 
something more than speaker meaning qua content that makes the difference between them, and this 
is given precisely by the order the two figurative meanings in which are processed.14 On an irony-
first approach, there is arguably no way of capturing the speaker‘s critical attitude towards the 
politician‘s inflated opinion about his important career, which takes on the metaphorical sense of 
important career, rather than the literal sense of his impressive height.  
More importantly, on an irony-first approach the hearer loses the delight of the intended 
irony, which is that of dramatizing upon the metaphorical, rather than the literal content. Depending 
on the theoretical stance on irony, the speaker of an ironic metaphor may be seen as either pretending 
to say something metaphorically, or as echoing someone else‘s metaphorical claim, with a view of 
drawing the hearer‘s attention to the contrast that such claim creates in the context, and thereby 
mocking those who might sincerely assent to such a claim. It is only on a metaphor-first approach 
that the target of the ironical attitude is correctly predicted, more specifically a metaphorical claim 
which is merely pretended or echoed. Since the ironic interpretation is conditioned upon the 
metaphorical one as the content of the pretence, or the relevant echo that needs to be recognized, the 
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 To sharpen the point, suppose there is a language, say Schminenglish, in which an ambiguous sentence has two 
meanings, p and not-p. Now, if Jim is using the sentence with the meaning p ironically then he would have meant 
not-p. But his partner does not disambiguate correctly and understands him as having meant not-p, as it were 
literally. Although he arrived at the same content not-p, he missed the irony because he did not follow the route 





resulting compound meaning arises as an implicature that is grounded in the metaphorical meaning. 
This captures the intuition that what speakers are ironic about is precisely the metaphorical content.  
 
2. Metaphor and What Is Said 
 
I will now consider what implications MPT has on the interpretation of metaphor and its 
relationship with what is said or the utterance‘s truth-conditions. On Grice‘s account, the metaphor 
interpretation is indirect in the sense that speakers express one thing but mean another. It arises from 
a blatant violation of the first maxim of Quality (―Do not say what you believe to be false‖), and is 
arrived at by first calculating the proposition literally expressed, which, given its conversational 
inappropriateness, leads the hearer to implicatures. However, having argued that in ironic metaphor, 
the metaphor is processed first, we must now ask whether in such cases, the metaphor is processed 
directly, that is, as part of what is said, or indirectly, that is, as implicature. I shall argue that it is 
processed directly. I first suggest that Bezuidenhout‘s (2001) claim that it is a consequence of MPT 
that metaphorical content is part of what is said does not follow, and then discuss five standard 
arguments for the conclusion that metaphorical meaning does contribute to an enriched content 
corresponding to what is said.15  
 
2.1 The Argument from MPT   
 
The lesson from MPT was that in cases of ironic metaphors, the irony arises as an implicature 
that is grounded in the metaphorical, rather than the literal content. A similar conclusion is reached 
by Bezuidenhout (2001) who argues that the metaphoric interpretation in such cases must be 
launched from the utterance itself and not from a pragmatic interpretation that is indirectly arrived at, 
for example from irony, indirect request, or any other implicature. The claim is that it is the metaphor 
that serves as a springboard for launching the irony, and not the other way around. This gives rise to 
the following procedure of interpretation in (13):  
 
(13) a metaphoric interpretation P is first generated from the particular expressions employed in a  
sentence S;  
P is then interpreted ironically, producing interpretation Q;  
Q can in turn generate a further implicature R. 
 
For example, to successfully interpret the utterance in (1b), repeated below as (14), the expression 
Taj Mahal must first be interpreted metaphorically that the woman in question is attractive and 
sophisticated, and then interpreted ironically that the woman in question is unattractive and boring. 
 
(14) She is the Taj Mahal.  
 
The ironical content computed in a second stage interpretation might possibly launch a further 
implicature of refusal to go out with the woman in question. 
Such a procedure of interpretation is revealing about the metaphor‘s status. More specifically, 
using the criterion that when a content launches implicatures it belongs to what is said by the 
utterance, Bezuidenhout (2001) argues that it is a consequence of how ironic metaphor is interpreted 
that the metaphorical meaning contributes to what is said rather than to what is implicated. However, 
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 ‗What is said‘ is here understood not in the Gricean/neo-Gricean sense (involving the semantic content of the 
sentence, plus disambiguation and reference assignment) but in terms of what speakers do/assert in uttering their 
words, whereby saying involves the direct expression of the speaker‘s intended meaning.  




Camp (2006) observes that Bezuidenhout‘s criterion of what is said is unreliable. She argues that 
both sarcasm and conversational implicature can launch further implicatures, but they do not count as 
what is said. For example, when Bill asks Alice whom they should invite for dinner, and Alice 
responds sarcastically, as in (15a), meaning (15b), Alice further implicates (15c). 
 
(15) a.  Well, Jane is always so utterly charming.  
b.  Jane is not an enjoyable person to have at dinner. 
c.  Under no condition should Jane be invited to dinner. 
 
Camp‘s point is a strong one.  Clearly, (15c) is implicated by the sarcastic content (15b). The latter is 
not something the speaker says/asserts, however. Ironical content is not something that is said by the 
utterance. (15b) is merely implied by the speaker.16 
While Camp‘s point against Bezuidenhout‘s suggestion that MPT entails that metaphor is 
part of what is said must be conceded, I think she is wrong to argue that the criterion of implicatures 
launching further implicatures is evidence in favour of a Gricean view of metaphor as conversational 
implicature. In pushing forward the idea that ―an implicature can be launched from P whenever the 
speaker‘s intention for U to be interpreted as P is sufficiently obvious, even though P is itself an 
implicature,‖ Camp (2006:291) suggests that metaphor can fit this scheme. It can launch ironic 
implicatures while still being itself an implicature.  
This argument is unwarranted, though. Although Camp importantly shows that some of the 
contents that launch implicatures are mere implicatures themselves, this is not true of metaphorical 
content. The reason we communicate information indirectly, via implicatures, is because we do not 
want to commit ourselves to the claim we merely suggest by them. Were we challenged we could 
easily retreat behind the literal meaning, because we did not assert the indirect meaning, committing 
ourselves to it. While this is typical of irony, it is not so of metaphor, particularly in the case of 
conversational metaphors. I will next discuss five standard contextualist arguments to argue that 
metaphor is indeed part of what is said. 
 
2.2  Five Contextualist Arguments for Metaphor’s Directness 
 
The first and second of these arguments are semantic. They concern the embeddability of 
metaphors within logical/propositional operators and the use of metaphors to make assertions. The 
third and fourth arguments make use of speakers‘/hearers‘ intuitions about the metaphorical content 
being communicated as part of what speakers communicate directly and explicitly. The fifth 
argument draws on empirical evidence about metaphor processing suggesting that metaphor 
processing is similar to that of literal speech. 
 
2.2.1  Embedded Metaphors 
 
Metaphors can embed both within the scope of logical operators (negation, counterfactuals, 
modals), and within the scope of propositional attitude operators (belief/speech reports). For 
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 Camp suggests that the conditions in which implicatures can launch further implicatures are as follows. ―In order 
for an implicature Q to be launched from an interpretation P of an utterance U, the speaker‘s intention for U to be 
interpreted as P has to be open and obvious, and not merely insinuated.‖ Although the ironical content is not part of 
what is said, sarcasm can meet this requirement because it is a ―well-established [route] for communicating 
something by an utterance other than its conventional meaning.‖ However, this criterion is unsatisfactory: the 






example, in (16), the expression used metaphorically (the sun) is embedded in Mercutio‘s report of 
Romeo‘s utterance:  
 
(16) Romeo believes/(said) that Juliet is the sun. 
 
Here, Mercutio is not attributing to Romeo the belief that Juliet is the real sun, but rather a belief 
provided by the metaphorical content that Juliet is beautiful, nurturing, and worthy of worship.  
That metaphorical content can be embedded in this way poses a problem for Grice‘s view 
that metaphorical content is conversationally implicated, since conversational implicatures are not 
embeddable within the scope of logical or propositional attitude operators. As Wearing (2006:313) 
observes, if metaphor were computed as an implicature, it would be triggered by sub-parts (‗the sun‘) 
of certain complex sentences which are not independently said/asserted by the speaker; only the 
complex sentence, here the belief-clause, is said/asserted.17 Grice‘s account cannot accommodate this 
fact, since on his account the metaphor as conversational implicature is the product of a conflict 
between what is said and the conversational maxims. Because the metaphorical content is embedded 
in (16), it is, so to speak, implicated by something that is not said/asserted.  
 
2.2.2  Truth-Aptness: Metaphorical Assertions 
 
Bergmann (1982) is one of the first to give an account of the assertive use of metaphor. She 
distinguishes a concept of ―pregnancy‖ of metaphor, which is typical of poetic metaphors that are 
rich and open-ended,18 from that of efficacy in asserting a specific proposition, which is typical of 
conversational metaphors, and argues that in the latter case the contents of metaphorical assertions, 
or their truth values, are no different in kind from those of literal assertions. They differ, not in the 
content of what is said, but only in the manner of saying it, where she defines manner as ―the 
systematic relation between the words used and the content of the illocutionary act‖ (1982:233). 
Bergmann (1982:234) further argues that the speaker‘s intention with a metaphorical 
assertion is to assert, not the proposition literally expressed by the sentence, but the content of what is 
communicated ―as a direct function of salient characteristics associated with (at least) part of the 
expression—rather than of the literal meaning of that part.‖ Independently of her conception of what 
the salient characteristics are and how they are selected, her main point that metaphorical content is 
quite a thin suggests that is rather part of the utterance content, rather than what the speaker 
implicates by it. A speaker who makes a metaphorical assertion does not intend to assert everything 
that can be ―read into‖ the metaphor, but only a specific part (the rest of the potential metaphorical 
readings are treated in terms of relevance-theory‘s notion of weak implicatures).  
Hills (1997), Stern (2000), and Bezuidenhout (2001) make similar claims that metaphorical 
sentences can be used to make assertions (or other speech acts that presuppose assertion), and that 
metaphorical utterances in declarative mood are bearers of truth value. Such a view follows from a 
certain conversational practice of using metaphors directly to express propositions that may be 
asserted or denied (or deployed with any other illocutionary force). As Stern (2000:304) argues, 
 
the distinction between the metaphorical and the literal […] is a distinction between two kinds of 
interpretations or uses of language, not between kinds of truth, or between the circumstances in 
which what is said is true or false. Metaphors no less that literal utterances of sentences can 
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 Bach (2001) distinguishes between an illocutionary act of stating/asserting (i.e. doing something by saying it), 
and a locutionary act, independent of speakers‘ communicative intention.  
18
 Metaphors‘ rich effects, in particular non-propositional ones, are the reason why Davidson (1978) rejects the idea 
that metaphors are compatible with assertions. 




therefore be actually true—just in case their interpretation, or what they are used to say, is true in the 
circumstances in which they are uttered. 
 
More specifically, when a metaphorical speaker utters a metaphor, she wishes not only to call 
hearers‘ attention to some similarity, but she aims to say/assert something true about a state of 
affairs.19 For example, when Romeo utters ―Juliet is the sun,‖ he says/asserts that Juliet has a specific 
property, for example that she‘s important in his life, thereby representing himself as believing it to 
be true, or at least defending it as true. The property he believes to be true of Juliet is a property 
metaphorically expressed, which needs to be included in the utterance (truth conditional) content, as 
it is this precise property that makes his utterance metaphorically true.20 Then his assertion is open to 
truth/falsity evaluation, and can be further agreed with or denied.  
 
2.2.3  Responses to and Reports of Metaphorical Utterances 
 
The fact that metaphorical content is asserted creates the conditions for it to be available for 
explicit responses in conversation. Since speakers/hearers take it to be what speakers intuitively 
say/assert, hearers may explicitly respond by taking up the speaker‘s very words, agreeing with or 
denying the speaker‘s metaphorical content. In particular, hearers may affirm, deny, question or 
elaborate on the metaphorical content expressed by the speaker‘s original utterance. As Hills (1997), 
Bezuidenhout (2001), and Wearing (2006) argue, hearers respond to metaphorical content as if it is 
what is said/asserted, rather than as something implicated; otherwise, such responses, as in (17) (from 
Bezuidenhout 2001:157), would be infelicitous. 
 
(17) A: Bill‘s a bulldozer. 
B: That‘s true. We want someone who‘ll stand up to the administration and get things for our 
department. 
C: I disagree that he‘s a bulldozer; that exterior hides someone who‘s basically insecure. But, 
either way, Bill wouldn‘t make a good chair. 
 
A, B and C are talking of the possibility of appointing Bill as head of department. The coherence of 
the exchange is ensured by the fact that all agree that the literally expressed proposition is false and 
that it is a metaphorical content that is the topic of conversation. By asserting that Bill is a bulldozer, 
A communicates explicitly, as opposed to implicating, that she thinks that Bill has a determined will 
and that he is a formidable person when pursuing his causes. B agrees with this metaphorical content, 
and reinforces explicitly the psychological dimension in which A is assessing Bill by making a claim 
about what characteristics are desirable in a head of department. In contrast, C denies this 
metaphorical content, arguing that in fact Bill‘s domineering behaviour betrays his inner insecurity.  
Since hearers can express their judgment of whether they think the metaphorical content is 
correct or not by replying ‗That‘s true/false,‘ it follows that the metaphorical content contributes to 
what is said by the utterance rather than to what is implicated by it. For we respond ‗That‘s 
true/false‘ only to what is said by an utterance. If the metaphorical content ‗genuinely tough guy‘ of 
                                                 
19 Metaphors have the potential of representing not what the words themselves represent, but what the speaker 
intends to represent in a direct/explicit way by choosing the relevant bits of the world-knowledge that are to fix the 
correct interpretation in a given context. In the same way as with literal communication, when using metaphors we 
strive to fit our words to the world, i.e. to represent something in the world (in a metaphorical way) by adjusting our 
words so as to include instances that wouldn‘t have normally fallen under their strict literal meanings. 
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 As Hintikka & Sandu (1994:157) argue, metaphorical truth is no different from literal truth: ―the truth conditions 
of statements containing a metaphoric expression are the same as normal truth conditions, given the nonliteral 





A‘s assertion were merely implicated, then responses of the kind B and C make, such as ―Yes, he is‖ 
or ―No, he‘s not,‖ would be infelicitous. As Wearing (2006:312) observes, ―one can‘t agree that Mr. 
X has no philosophical talent by saying ‗Yes, that‘s right,‘ in response to Grice‘s example of the 
letter of recommendation, ‗Mr. X is always punctual and has nice handwriting.‘‖ In contrast, if that 
same content were uttered in declarative mood metaphorically, i.e. as what the speaker expresses 
directly and takes responsibility for, such responses would be perfectly natural.  
Against this, Camp (2006) claims that the openness to dialectical dispute about instantiating 
the defence of a certain mental state with a metaphor is an insurmountable problem for the view that 
metaphorical content is part of what the speaker said/asserted. Camp suggests that the indefensibility 
of the intended metaphorical content in the face of a literalist challenge—that a metaphorical speaker 
cannot retort ―That‘s not what I said,‖ and should retract her original utterance, ceding that the literal 
interpretation is a possible interpretation of her words—is evidence that such content is a poor 
candidate for what is said. In her view, this alleged vulnerability to literalist challenge is a sign of the 
commitment the metaphorical speaker has undertaken with her utterance, namely as beholding to a 
set of linguistic norms which require her to justify her utterance in the face of such challenges. While 
anyone would take the insistence upon a literal interpretation as uncooperative, or conversationally 
inapt (as it happens in a conversation with an autistic person), and would respond to the challenge by 
clarifying one‘s intended meaning (literally paraphrasing it, or giving a more accessible metaphorical 
content), Camp thinks that an interpretive indulgence ―playing along‖ with the metaphor, or 
clarifying it, are impossible because the speaker has less authority to defend her metaphorical claim 
than with strict literal meaning. Whereas literal speakers, using ambiguity or graded adjectives, are 
not vulnerable to the same sort of challenge, in that they can accept the literal consequences a hearer 
may bring up, or deny that they follow from what they said, a metaphorical speaker cannot do so 
without sacrificing her claim to linguistic competence with the words used. This follows, in Camp‘s 
view, from a ―normative priority‖ of literal over non-literal/metaphorical meaning, and it is this 
difference between them which makes it difficult, if not impossible, for metaphorical meaning to be 
part of utterance content.  
I think this sort of normativity is misplaced, however. In the realm of intentions and actions, 
no norm of language can force one to be strictly literal when a contextual meaning, rather than the 
literal one, is already established as the topic of conversation. It is the consistency with the intended 
contextual meaning set in place by the initial speaker that explains the coherence of the reply in (18) 
(from Lang‘s Human Desire): 
 
(18) Vicky: I‘m chained. 
Jeff: No you‘re not. You‘re not tied to him. You can leave him and we get married. 
 Vicky: I can‘t. I am chained. 
 
Clearly, Vicky‘s initial remark talking about her marriage is metaphorical, and anyone who doesn‘t 
see that is either misrepresenting her or misunderstanding her. In effect, Jeff‘s reply acknowledges 
her metaphorical meaning, the content of which he takes to be that of being tied to her husband by 
the bondage of marriage. He denies it, suggesting that she is free to do whatever she likes with her 
life. As it happens, Vicky was metaphorical, but she didn‘t give enough evidence of the sort of 
constraints that tie her to her husband, namely an incriminating letter her husband made her write and 
then kept. Under this interpretation, the metaphorical content is one that draws on a much closer 
resemblance to a literal claim of being forced/constrained against one‘s will, but still it isn‘t a literal 
content of being confined in real chains. 
This seems to suggest that in natural conversational contexts participants are not beholden by 
any normativity of the literal over the non-literal. The literal meaning plays a role in guiding the 
construction of the intended meaning, but once a contextual meaning is accepted as intended, there is 




no other role for the literal meaning to play. In rational, charitable, and efficient communication we 
are held responsible only with respect to the mental states we present ourselves as defending, and not 
with respect to the strict rules of language. The purpose of communication is to exploit those rules of 
language so as to communicate rich, varied thoughts with a scarceness of linguistic resources.21 This 
may be the case even in high-stake contexts, like courtrooms, in which Camp thinks that the literal 
meaning should be (and is) the norm. In court a case turns on information. Consequently, it is the 
content which, for example, witnesses assert that matters, not their manner of saying it. Metaphors 
are not any obstacle to speaking truthfully. Unclarity is hardly the preserve of the non-literal, and if 
the judge is discontent with the imprecision of a witness‘ metaphorical assertions, she may be asked 
to clarify what she meant. She would be under no obligation to retract her metaphorical utterance, 
however. A prosecution witness who is asked to judge the defendant‘s character might assert ―He‘s 
the Devil.‖ In so doing she does not risk violating the oath that requires her to speak the truth merely 
because she speaks metaphorically.  
 
2.2.4  Availability Criterion 
 
Récanati (2004) posits the Availability Criterion to distinguish primary processes 
(corresponding to what is said) from secondary processes (corresponding to conversational 
implicatures), arguing that only the secondary processes are available to hearers. In follows from the 
Availability Criterion that since the processes involved in the interpretation of many conversational 
metaphors, such as ―The ATM swallowed my credit card,‖ are not consciously available to hearers, 
that the metaphorical content contributes to what is said. Récanati argues that this is so because the 
modulation process of loosening that is responsible for the metaphoric interpretation of the 
expression ‗swallow‘ operates locally, before the literal sentence meaning is computed. Even in more 
complex cases of creative metaphors, such as ―The ATM swallowed my credit card, chewed for a 
while and then spat it out,‖ where hearers might become aware of some discrepancy between literal 
and metaphorical meanings, yielding some sort of duality, Récanati insists that hearers are still 
unaware of the connection between the two meanings. He calls such duality ―internal,‖ because 
hearers are aware of it only insofar as they are aware of the output of what is said by the utterance.  
Camp (2006) objects to Récanati‘s solution, arguing that the notion of an internal duality 
supports a Gricean view of metaphor as conversational implicature. While agreeing with Camp‘s 
intuition, Récanati‘s argument holds good. The point is that even in complex cases where hearers 
become aware of a certain discrepancy between literal and metaphorical meanings, the fact remains, 
Récanati argues, that their awareness is quite different from the kind of awareness that is involved in 
paradigmatic cases of conversational implicatures, since they are aware of neither the sub-personal 
machinery, nor of any inferential link from the primary to the secondary meaning. 
 
2.2.5  Psycholinguistic Evidence 
 
Two kinds of empirical study, one regarding the neural processes involved in metaphor 
interpretation, the other regarding comprehension times, suggest that metaphor comprehension is 
direct, in the sense that it comes first in the order of interpretation. First, Coulson & van Petten 
(2002) question a sharp distinction between literal and metaphoric interpretation on the grounds that 
both sorts of interpretation engage similar brain processes. Secondly, Gibbs (1994), Gibbs & Tendahl 
                                                 
21
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(2006), and Glucksberg (2001) found no difference in the times taken to interpret literal and 
comparable metaphorical utterances.22  
Such findings suggest that contextual processes penetrate the lexical ones early on, fine-
tuning appropriate contextual meanings so that the interpretation is effortless and seamless. In many 
cases, the metaphorical meaning is accessed straight away without activating a literal interpretation 
of the whole utterance and then rejecting it. In conversational metaphors, speakers directly express 
their metaphorical thoughts, and hearers are not ordinarily aware of the distinction between literal 




In this paper, I argued that the interpretation of cases in which metaphor and irony are 
combined requires a determined order of interpretation so as to reach the intended compound 
meaning, and that the most explanatory approach is a metaphor-first order of interpretation on which 
metaphor is computed prior to irony (MPT). I distinguished between a logical MPT and a 
psychological MPT. Whereas the logical thesis is concerned with how contents are logically 
structured such that they work as input for other contents, the psychological thesis is concerned with 
the psychological order in which the two figurative meanings are processed. Logical MPT holds that 
the irony necessarily builds on the metaphorical, rather than the literal content, if it is to be properly 
inferentially grounded. More specifically, the ironical meaning arises as an implicature that is 
grounded in metaphorical content. Psychological MPT relies on empirical evidence to the effect that 
metaphorical meaning is processed generally quicker (and is less complex than irony), which 
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